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Introduction 
One of the major challenges a multinational corporation (MNC) can face when expanding 
abroad is to legitimize its operations before the host country’s society. MNCs are more 
vulnerable than domestic firms to be targeted by domestic agents who use the MNC’s 
country of origin or the reputation of other MNCs in the same industry to delegitimize its 
operations and promote hostile actions against the foreign firm (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999).  When facing these challenges, the MNC can find itself in position of 
disadvantage with respect to local actors because it might lack a deep knowledge of the 
subtleties and complexities of the host country’s polities and society (Zaheer, 1995).  The 
extant literature in international business argues that MNCs can minimize these 
challenges by integrating domestic actors in the MNC’s subsidiary.  The more powerful 
or influential these actors, international business scholars argue, the lower the risk for the 
MNC of having the legitimacy of its operations challenged (Boddewyn and Brewer, 
1994; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Mizruchi, 1996; Podolny, 
2001). In this paper we study the limitations of this strategy and these interpretations by 
introducing in the analysis the moderating effect of institutional change at the macro-
political level in the host country on the relationship between the degree of integration of 
domestic actors and the legitimacy of the MNC’s operations.  By introducing this type of 
change we aim to make a contribution not only to the international business literature, but 
also to the neo-institutional interpretation of corporate legitimacy developed in 
organizational theory. We define the legitimacy of an MNC subsidiary as “its acceptance 
by the specific host country institutional environment” (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999, p. 
65). 
By not explicitly including the effect of institutional change in their analysis 
scholars in international business have neglected to consider the fact that the domestic 
perception of legitimacy of the MNCs’ operations is tied to the domestic perception of 
the legitimacy of the institutional framework under the foreign firm is operating.  Not 
considering the changing nature of the institutional framework under which MNCs 
operate will lead us to wrongly assume that this framework is stable, unchallenged, and 
uncontested or would only permit us to only analyze MNCs operating in highly stable 
political and social environments.  On the other hand, neo-institutional scholars have 
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considered how institutional changes affect the legitimacy of organizations.  The level of 
analysis of these scholars, however, is limited to what they define as the ‘organizational 
field’ level, which is the ‘sets of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute an area of 
institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organizations that produce similar services or products’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, pp. 148-149).  As a result, neo-institutional scholars in organizational studies focus 
on the sources and mechanisms of institutional change at the field level and how this 
affects organizations (Hinings, et al., 2003).  Following this approach, Suchman (1995) 
argues that when there are changes at the institutional field level the perceived legitimacy 
of a firm’s operations can be questioned forcing the firm to develop strategies to adapt to 
the new conditions. Ruef and Scott (1998), Meyer and Scott (1983), Scott (2008), and 
Scott et al. (2000) add that legitimacy is multi-dimensional and is not the same at the 
subunit level within the firm, individual organizations, or entire organizational 
populations.  Although we agree with the latter scholars’ views of legitimacy and 
institutional change, we believe that reducing our analysis to the organizational field 
limits our comprehension of how changes taking place in the environment in which an 
MNC operates can affect the firm’s legitimacy and corporate strategy.  In this aspect, we 
agree with Greenwood, et al. (2008) who claim that neo-institutionalism has increasingly 
focused on organizations as the generators of change in the organizational field rather 
than those affected by institutional change.  In this paper we focus on the wider political 
institutional framework, its perceived legitimacy, and on its effects on the perceived 
legitimacy of foreign firms’ operations.  We use the theoretical framework developed by 
the neo-institutional scholars in political science and economic history who define 
institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction [which consist 
of] informal constraints and formal rules and their enforcement” (Weingast, 2003, p. 
202). Weingast (1995, p. 2) includes in these arrangements written constitutions, which 
he defines as “the set of institutions governing political decision making… and how 
policy choices are made.” Leftwich (2007) adds that institutions are never neutral and are 
designed to distribute advantage to some and disadvantage to others. By using this 
framework we aim to contribute to the existing neo-institutional analyses in 
organizational studies by adding a higher level of institutional framework and analyzing 
 4 
how changes at this level can affect the legitimacy of foreign firms.  By their very nature, 
MNCs cannot be analyzed only at the field level.  These firms operate in different 
countries with different political and institutional environments and can move to places 
where the institutional framework is more favorable and less hostile to their operations 
(Witt and Lewin, 2007).   
We propose a new theoretical framework with the concept of obsolescing 
legitimacy, which we define as a foreign firm’s gradual loss of legitimacy before the local 
society resulting from the identification of this firm with a previous social and/or political 
regime increasingly perceived as illegitimate or archaic.  For a firm that engaged in a 
strategy of integration of domestic legitimating actors in order to increase its legitimacy, 
institutional changes at the macro-political level can make this strategy (and therefore, 
the firm’s legitimacy) gradually obsolete.  The consequences of the moderating role of 
institutional change on the degree of legitimacy manifest themselves in changes in the 
firm’s political risk and vertical integration.  For a firm with major investments in the 
country going through these types of institutional changes, this can generate threats to its 
assets and encourage divestiture, which would be particularly important in vertically 
integrated firms with significant assets in the host country.  Our approach can provide us 
a fundamental understanding of the mechanisms governing the politics of foreign direct 
investment, which can be particularly relevant when studying MNC’s operations in 
politically unstable countries.  We illustrate our point with the case of the American 
banana producing and marketing corporation United Fruit Company in Central America 
during the twentieth century.  With our proposed framework, we contribute to the neo-
institutional literature in organizational studies by adding a higher level of institutional 
change and by considering the presence of firms in different sovereign nation-states.  We 
also contribute to the international business literature by considering, first, the possible 
moderating effect of institutional change (at the political level and not just the 
organizational field level) on the relationship between the integration of legitimating 
actors within the firm and legitimacy and, second, the consequences of these moderating 
effects on the MNC’s political risk and, as a result, vertical integration. 
This paper is organized as follows.  In the next (second) section we explain our 
theory of obsolescing legitimacy.  In the third section we provide our methodology.  The 
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fourth section illustrates our point with the case of an American MNC in the Central 
American banana industry.  The fifth, and last section, draws the conclusions. 
 
Theory: Obsolescing Legitimacy 
In this section we provide the general rationale of our theory of obsolescing legitimacy 
and how it contributes to the extant literature on the legitimating strategies by MNCS.   
 
Integration of Domestic Actors as a Legitimating Strategy 
Several scholars have defined some solutions for the MNC to deal with local challenges 
to the legitimacy of its operations.  Kostova and Zaheer (1999) maintain that an MNC can 
neutralize or decrease local challenges to the legitimacy of its operations by hiring local 
employees in the MNC’s subsidiary, especially individuals with the power to legitimize 
the MNC’s operations before the rest of the society. In this way, the foreign firm would 
integrate domestic legitimating actors.  A step for even closer integration with the 
domestic society is proposed by other scholars who argue that firms can gain legitimacy 
before the domestic society by appointing influential members of the host country’s elite 
as directors of the subsidiary’s board (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Mizruchi, 1996; Podolny, 
2001).  Finally, an even further step would consist on the integration of the host country’s 
domestic polities within the MNC’s corporate structure by having high-ranking members 
of the host country’s government as part of the company or as direct beneficiaries of the 
company’s operations (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Thus, whether it is through hiring 
more domestic employees or having the host country’s ruler as direct beneficiary of the 
firm’s operations, these authors argue that an integration of domestic actors within the 
firm can serve as a mechanism to decrease local challenges to the MNC’s legitimacy.  
However, as we argue in this paper, the inclusion of institutional change at the political 
level as a moderating factor shows the limitations of the integration of domestic actors as 
a legitimating strategy. 
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Political Conflict and Institutional Change 
We develop our theory using as our starting point the theory of origins of dictatorship and 
democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) and the theory of political survival (Bueno 
de Mesquita, et al., 2003).  These theories provide an explanation on the origins of 
different institutional systems, how these systems legitimize themselves, and the role of 
social movements and struggles over economic resources in defining the characteristics 
of a particular institutional system.  In contrast to the neo-institutional theory in 
organizational studies as summarized by Scott (2008), these theories do not analyze 
institutions at the field level, but at the macro-political level.  The approaches developed 
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) allow us to 
develop a theoretical framework relevant for international business. 
 In the theory of the origins of dictatorship and democracy, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006, 2007) maintain that the political status quo in a society results from a 
history of previous conflicts between different groups or social classes over economic 
resources.  Each of these conflicting groups has an ideal set of political institutions from 
which they will obtain economic benefit, and by the moment in which the conflict is 
settled those with greater political power define the final institutional outcome. The 
political institutions created by the winners determine how the political power and 
economic resources are distributed. Therefore, for those who do not benefit from an 
existing institutional arrangement (even if they have a de jure power), the only option to 
change the status quo is through a direct challenge against the system with an eventual 
change of the institutions rather than organizing themselves under already existing rules. 
As long as a new institutional framework is consolidated the system preceding it will be 
considered and represented as illegitimate by those benefiting from the newly triumphant 
system (O’Donnell, 1982).  
The selectorate theory of political survival allows us to define how rulers and 
their supporters or opponents deal with each other regarding these struggles for economic 
rents, how this can affect the institutional environment, and its perceived legitimacy.  In 
this theory Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) define selectorate as the “set of people whose 
endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the 
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government’s leadership” (p. 42) and the winning coalition as the “subset of the 
selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with 
political power over the remainder of the selectorate” (p. 51).  Democratic pluralistic 
countries tend to have large winning coalitions and autocratic countries tend to have 
small ones.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) predict that a leader (ruler/president) will 
stay in power by using the tax income and distribute it among his winning coalition as 
public or private goods.  A ruler with a small winning coalition will distribute taxes as 
private goods to the members of this coalition.  Although this kind of policy does not 
benefit the population as a whole, Bueno de Mesquita and Root (2000) maintain, it is 
essential for the ruler’s survival.  Following the logic defined by Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006, 2007), those not benefited by the existing distribution of rents will try to challenge 
the system and change the institutional environment in their favor to achieve another rent 
distribution.  In terms of the theory of political survival, this can mean that the group 
excluded from the winning coalition and selectorate can have strong interests in 
questioning the legitimacy of the institutional framework that permits the existing 
distribution of rents.  
Both the theory of the origins of dictatorship and democracy (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006) and political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003), predict that 
when a leader faces increasing challenges to the existing distribution of rents he/she has 
two potentially costly choices: repression or redistribution (higher allocation of public 
goods in detriment of private ones).  The decision will depend on how high the ruler 
considers the risk of being overthrown is.  If a leader is eventually overthrown, those 
taking power will have a different coalition they will reward to assure its loyalty, which 
they can do by establishing a new institutional framework that guarantees a new rent 
distribution.  For Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) the mechanism that will make the 
previous regime illegitimate comes from changing the institutional framework, while for 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) it comes from having a different winning coalition ruling 
the country. 
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Institutional Change and Obsolescing Legitimacy: Implications for MNCs 
The theories of political survival and origins of dictatorship and democracy have 
important implications for the field of international business, because the mechanisms of 
institutional change can become a source of illegitimacy for the operations of an MNC. If 
a large percentage of the population perceives certain fairness in the way rents are 
distributed, the system will enjoy a high degree of stability.  Under these circumstances, a 
MNC will benefit from integrating those legitimating actors of the society.  However, in a 
country in which the institutional framework is increasingly questioned and eventually 
changed (in some cases), being related to the previous regime will decrease the 
legitimacy of the MNC’s operations.  
 The legitimating actors in the society an MNC can approach will differ depending 
on the type of winning coalition keeping the government in power.  A regime with a 
small coalition would leave the firms alone as long as they generate rents for the ruler’s 
inner circle.  On the other hand, a regime with a large coalition might increase the rents it 
extracts from foreign firms to distribute among its coalition members.  In either case, the 
group excluded from the winning coalition will perceive the existing rent distribution and 
the institutional framework that allows it to exist as unfair or illegitimate.  Depending on 
how solid the institutional system is and/or how powerful those challenging it are, there 
can be political conflicts that change the group holding power and replace it for another 
one depending on a different coalition.  After these changes, the previous policies 
towards foreign MNCs can be questioned as well as the previous integration by these 
MNCs of some particular domestic actors.  With political changes resulting in challenges 
to the MNC’s legitimacy and calls to redistribute the rents generated by the foreign firm, 
we predict the MNC will opt for two types of strategy to reduce this risk: (a) to confront 
the government and intervene in politics to stop the changes taking place, and (b) to 
divest its operations reducing the assets the government can use to reward its coalition.  
Unless the MNC has a very strong political power, the second option will be the most 
viable one. 
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Moderating Role of Institutional Change 
In Figure 1, we display the rationale of our model in which we integrate the theory of 
origins of dictatorship and democracy and the theory of political survival to develop our 
theory of obsolescing legitimacy.  Without institutional changes, the integration of 
influential political actors in the MNC’s corporate strategy in a time (t0) can provide the 
MNC with political legitimacy.  When institutional changes occur between a time (t+2), 
those now defining the rules of the game will question not only the previous institutional 
environment, but also the links between the MNCs and the previous legitimating actors.  
Under these circumstances, this previous integration in the time t0 will have a negative 
effect on the firm’s political legitimacy.  With its legitimacy increasingly under threat, 
the MNC will face increasing political risks between (t+2) and (t+3).  If the firm is 
vertically integrated in the host country its property rights will also be under threat.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Consequences of Changes in Legitimacy 
When an institutional change that delegitimizes the previously existing one takes place, 
the arrangements made between the MNC and the previous regime might be considered 
illegitimate.  If the MNC integrated influential political actors within its structure before 
the institutional change took place, this integration will be considered illegitimate as well.  
This increasing perception of illegitimacy will generate political risks for the MNC, 
because a government ruling with a different winning coalition from the previous one 
will be tempted to act against the rents received by the MNC, which can be done by 
increasing the percentage of rents appropriated by domestic actors (including the 
government) or by expropriating the corporations’ assets.  For vertically integrated firms 
with a significant amount of their assets in the host country, these institutional changes 
will put the property rights of their assets (and its vertically integrated structure) in 
danger, which might encourage the firm to divest.  On the other hand, a political change 
that brings a small coalition to power might consider a more widespread distribution of 
rents unfair and illegitimate and might try to redistribute these rents for the benefit of this 
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small coalition.  In this case, the MNC’s properties can be safer if they benefit this small 
coalition.  
 A general model of the dynamics behind institutional change, its effects on the 
legitimacy of a strategy of integration of domestic actors by an MNC, and its possible 
effects on vertical integration are displayed in Figure 2.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Methodology and Sample 
Sample: United Fruit Company (UFCO) in Central America 
We study the relationship between institutional change and loss of legitimacy of an MNC 
by analyzing the case of UFCO in Central America during the twentieth century.  We 
chose this company for the following reasons: first, UFCO is considered a quintessential 
case of an MNC integrating within its corporate structure the polities of the host countries 
in which it operated (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994).  The very term “Banana Republic” 
was coined after UFCO’s operations in this continent to describe the political power this 
firm had in the small Central American republics (Bucheli, 2008; Kepner & Soothill, 
1935; Langley, 2002; Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990; Zanetti & García, 1976).  Therefore, 
this is a representative case of a company integrating domestic polities within its firm. 
Second, UFCO concentrated its banana producing operations in Central America 
and the Caribbean particularly in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala (which are the 
countries we analyze in this paper). Table 1, shows the high degree of dependence on 
banana exports for these three countries.  Between 1900 up to the late 1950s, UFCO 
controlled above 70% of the international banana market, which came mostly from these 
three nations, so the company’s operations are representative of the company’s 
international operations (Bucheli, 2005).  This allows us to control for possible noise 
created by other corporations or other industries in the producing countries.  
 Third, during the period when UFCO built its vertically integrated banana 
producing and marketing structure, the US had an overwhelming and unchallenged 
political and economic power in Central America. Before 1945, the US had already 
invaded Honduras (1903, 1907, 1912, 1919, 1924), the Dominican Republic (1903, 1914, 
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1916), Haiti (1914, 1915), Nicaragua (1907, 1909, 1915), Cuba (1906, 1912, 1917), 
Panama (1912, 1918, 1925), Guatemala (1920), and El Salvador (1932) (Langley, 2002).  
This US presence in the region opened the door to many American companies to start 
operations in that region (Wilkins, 1974).  From the three countries we analyze, the most 
invaded one was Honduras with Guatemala in second place.  Costa Rica, on the other 
hand, was not invaded during this period.  This allows us to eliminate the influence of 
other foreign political powers in the region.  Before World War II, both the US 
government and the US media saw UFCO’s operations in Central America as strategic in 
terms of assuring US presence in the region and as civilizer of backward peoples.  After 
the 1950s the good relationship between UFCO and the US government started to sour 
due to UFCO’s non-compliance with the US anti-trust legislation.  In 1954, the US 
Department of Justice sued the company and forced it to divest some of its assets.  After 
this period, the US media also started to criticize the company’s operations.  Despite of 
these changing relations, the US remained as the sole power in the region, eliminating 
from the analysis the possible influence of other countries. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Method 
This paper combines historical and political analysis with quantitative analysis.  We use 
historical narrative to analyze the struggles over economic rents in Central America and 
the integration of domestic actors by UFCO.  We use quantitative analysis to study 
UFCO’s process of vertical integration and the changing level of risk perceived by the 
firm of its operations in relation to the institutional changes taking place in Central 
America.  Our main variables are the following: 
Vertical integration: We study UFCO’s process of vertical integration (and de-
integration) by looking at the weight of its main assets in the producing areas (lands and 
railways) over their total fixed assets and the number of acres the company owned in 
Central America.  The heavier the weight of these assets over total assets, the more 
UFCO was integrated backwards. 
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Polity: We use the Polity IV scores to consider the constraints over the executive 
power in each of the three countries (Center for Systemic Peace, 2009; Henisz, 2000), 
which is a good proxy to determine the government’s coalition size.  We complement this 
information with an analysis of the degree of stability in each country by studying how 
each of the rulers of these countries ascended to power and how they lost it (either by 
military coups or elections), to determine how dramatic the institutional changes were (if 
present).   
 Political integration: The degree of integration of the local elite within the 
company’s structure is determined by looking at which rulers were put in power by or 
with strong help of UFCO.  We also look at high-ranking officials in the governments of 
each country and their relation with UFCO. Finally, we see in which countries UFCO had 
a stronger power to overthrow a government and in which one it had more constraints to 
do so.   
Political risk: A crucial element to understand how the political and social 
changes taking place in Central America affected UFCO, we calculated the firm’s yield 
on common stock and created a unique index of the yield on common stock for the firms 
in the Dow Jones (DJ) for the period between 1925 and 1975 and for firms in similar 
industries (rubber and sugar).  The yield on common stock tells us how much dividend a 
stock provides.  Relatively high yields can be a sign of an unsustainable high dividend 
likely to be cut in the future and often is considered a sign of a troubled company.  Aware 
that the firms included in the DJ have changed throughout the period we study, we 
created a firm-year database composed by the firms included in the index each year.  We 
retrieve this detailed information from Dow Jones (2009).  We then proceeded to retrieve 
the financial data of the firms listed in our firm-year database from the CRSP (Center for 
Research in Security Prices) database via the Wharton Research Data Services.1  With 
this information we calculated the companies’ own perception of how risky their 
operations were by dividing the information on firms’ dividends over its stock price.  We 
calculated the yearly risk of the firms by retrieving the monthly stock price and dividend 
                                                        
1 This database provides information on security prices, return, and volume of shares traded from the 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ indices.  From the CRSP we used the PERMNO identifier, which allows us 
to conduct uninterrupted time-series analysis, regardless of changes in the Committee on Uniform Security 
Identification Procedures (CUSIP) identifier, ticker, company name, or the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. 
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information from the “Monthly Stocks” menu in the CRSP database (the information was 
not available yearly).  We then calculate the monthly yield of the firms and converted it 
into yearly format by averaging them per year.  We compare the risk calculations of all 
the firms in the DJ with that of UFCO and firms operating in the sugar and rubber sectors 
in order to control for industry effects.  We used these firms because they have similar 
characteristics to UFCO (exploiting an agricultural good that could only be grown in the 
tropics).  These firms are US Rubber, Firestone, Goodyear, Goodrich, and General Tire in 
the rubber industry.   
We are aware that a high yield can be the result of many factors and not only a 
political risk.  A company with no dividends can be as attractive to investors as one with 
a generous dividend that attempts to compensate risky fluctuations in the stock price 
(Ortner, 1964).  In order to avoid misinterpretations of this yield we read it along with the 
reports by Moody’s Investors Service and UFCO’s annual reports where they analyze the 
main sources of risk the company faced.  As we show in the paper, for both the firm and 
Moody’s most risks came from the changing politics in Central America. 
 Legitimacy: We study how legitimate the UFCO’s operations were perceived by 
following Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) definition of legitimacy as its ‘acceptance by the 
specific host country institutional environment’ (p. 65).  We determined the particular 
moments in which the company’s operations were challenged by a domestic government 
replacing a previous one and when these actions were justified by the new regime by 
portraying the firm as allied to the previous regime.  To determine this we used historical 
literature on the period and countries we analyze and the analyses on the political risks 
existing in Central America as published in the reports on UFCO by Moody’s Investors 
Service and by UFCO’s annual reports to the stockholders. 
 
United Fruit Company and Vertical Integration 
Since the early times of the existence of the banana industry, there have been several 
incentives for vertical integration.  Imports of bananas to the United States started in the 
1860s, but most companies failed to remain in business because of the very nature of 
bananas: they rot quickly, they require careful handling, and they cannot be stored or 
frozen, so a close coordination between producers, transporters, and retailers was crucial. 
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This lack of coordination led to a very high mortality rate among the banana companies: 
from 114 banana companies established between 1870 and 1899, only 22 survived by 
1899 (Read, 1983).  UFCO was created in 1899 after the merger of the interests of 
Andrew Preston and Minor Keith, whose interests complemented each other perfectly: 
Keith owned lands and an extensive railway line in Central America, and controlled the 
banana market of the Southwest US; Preston, on the other hand, owned the Great White 
Fleet (which eventually became the largest privately owned steamship fleet in the world), 
plantations in the West Indies, and controlled the banana market of the US Northeast 
(May & Plaza, 1958). By the 1920s, the company had an extensive network of 
plantations (which included housing, schools, and hospitals), telegraph and telephone 
lines, ports, and railways (Bucheli, 2005; Wilkins, 1970, 1974). UFCO also integrated 
forward by acquiring or creating distribution firms in Europe and the US (Bucheli & 
Read, 2006; Jenkins, 2000).  When relying on local providers, the company tied them 
with contracts that did not allow these domestic planters to sell their fruit to anyone else 
(Bucheli, 2004).  This integration reduced risks of potential opportunism by providers or 
deficient coordination in different steps of the process (Bucheli, Mahoney & Vaaler, 
2010).  
 Figure 3 shows UFCO’s process of vertical integration in the pre-WWII period, 
but a gradual divestiture in the 1950s and 1960s. As the figure shows, the only asset that 
increased its importance was the steamship fleet the company owned.  Figure 4, also 
shows an increase with subsequent decrease on the absolute number of acres owned by 
the company.  This means, UFCO gradually transformed itself from a producing and 
marketing company into a marketing one.  In the following sections we show the 
relationship between this process of divestiture and the company’s obsolescing 
legitimacy resulting from changes in the institutional environment. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE] 
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Country Cases and the Moderating Role of Institutional Change 
In this section we study the changing relationship between UFCO and the banana 
producing countries within the context of institutional change (or lack of it).  The three 
countries we study do not share the same political history, which allows us to do a 
comparative study.  Figure 5, displays the Polity IV scores for each of them and shows 
how Costa Rica enjoyed a fairly democratic and stable regime, with Guatemala having 
some ups and downs, and Honduras with a very unstable system and more years of 
dictatorial rule than the other two. Table 2, shows the degree of stability in each country, 
being Costa Rica the country with the smoothest transitions and Honduras the place with 
the largest number of presidents overthrown by a coup.  The following sub-sections study 
the evolution of UFCO’s operations in each of the three countries. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Honduras 
Overview 
Honduras constitutes a case of the country where UFCO managed to most successfully 
integrate domestic polities within its corporate structure.  The company avoided major 
challenges to its operations by keeping a close relationship with governments that ruled 
with a very small winning coalition.  Although some institutional changes took place, 
they were not dramatic enough to seriously challenge UFCO’s power.  The strategy 
worked until an economic crisis threatened the government’s stability and the country’s 
rulers went against the MNC in order to increase rents. In order to succeed in this 
strategy, the government changed the size of its winning coalition and allied with the 
working class in its fight against UFCO, its old ally.  As Table 1 shows, Honduras was 
the most highly banana exports dependent country and had the least diversified economy. 
 
Integration of Domestic Polities 
UFCO’s integration of Honduran polities started through another corporation. In 1911, 
Samuel Zemurray, the president of Cuyamel Fruit Company (and future UFCO president) 
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funded and provided men for a rebellion against a government that had previously 
approved some timid measures limiting foreign ownership in Honduras.  The president 
was overthrown and the subsequent two new governments quickly eliminated the 
previous legislation and granted Cuyamel generous tax benefits and land concessions, 
which eventually benefited UFCO when it acquired Cuyamel in 1930 (Kepner, 1936; 
MacCameron, 1983; Taracena, 1993). 
Parallel to Cuyamel’s expansion, UFCO sought to gradually increase its own 
power in Honduras.  In 1914, describing UFCO’s strategies to obtain land concessions 
the US Ambassador in Honduras wrote that ‘in order to obtain these concessions and 
privileges and to secure their undisturbed enjoyment, [UFCO] has seen fit to enter 
actively into the internal politics of these countries, and it has pursued this course so 
systematically and regularly until it now has its ramifications in every department of the 
government and is a most important factor in all political movements and actions’ 
(Euraque, 1996: 43-44). 
The competition between Cuyamel and UFCO led the two companies to stronger 
political interventionism.  In 1917, Honduras and Guatemala were on the brink of war 
over a territory disputed by the two companies, and in 1928 the two countries finally 
went to war over this territory.  UFCO encouraged and supported the conflict on the 
Guatemalan side and Cuyamel on the Honduran side (Dosal, 1993).  The US government 
settled the conflict and afterwards the two companies merged their interests when UFCO 
acquired Cuyamel’s assets and, with it, Cuyamel’s political connections: Juan Gálvez, a 
congressman (1925-1929) and Honduras’ minister of war (1933-1949) had 
simultaneously been Cuyamel’s main lawyer and after the merger he represented UFCO.  
In addition, UFCO’s lawyer Presentación Quezada was Honduras’ vice-president (1925-
1929), and Plutarco Muñoz, another company’s lawyer, was president of the National 
Congress (1933-1949) (García, 1997). 
UFCO’s political power in Honduras increased even more after the election of 
General Tiburcio Carías in 1932, under whom UFCO clearly became an important 
member of the president’s winning coalition.  With a presidential campaign financed by 
UFCO, Carías turned his government into a dictatorship that lasted until 1949 (Posas, 
1993; Díaz, 1982).  Carías supported UFCO when the company’s workers and providers 
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went on strike after UFCO decreased wages and purchasing price of bananas and granted 
the company with more concessions and tax exemptions (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). The 
US ambassador noted in 1933 that ‘no fruit company… ever exercised a more powerful 
influence and control of a Honduran government than does [UFCO]… with Carías’ 
(Euraque, 1996, p. 58).  In the 1930s, UFCO also owned the country’s main radio 
broadcaster and the main national newspaper (Barahona, 2002).  In addition, between 
1931 and 1949 the company loaned the government around $2.4 million mostly to 
purchase weapons and pay the military salaries (García, 1997).  
  
Institutional Changes 
After World War II, Honduras went through a series of political events that changed the 
size of the government’s coalition affecting UFCO’s perceived legitimacy in the long-
term.  In 1949, Manuel Gálvez, a former UFCO lawyer, succeeded the ageing dictator 
Carías as president.  Despite his background, Gálvez freed political prisoners, allowed the 
return of political exiles, created the country’s first income tax, and instituted labor 
reforms benefiting workers.  These actions empowered the banana workers, who went on 
strike in 1954.  During the strike (which was joined by other workers and became the 
largest in Honduras’ history), the government refused to repress with the army as UFCO 
requested (MacCameron, 1983).  During the 1950s and 1960s Honduras experienced an 
increase in the number of peasant federations, the rise of a non-banana agricultural 
domestic middle class, and government support for an import substitution 
industrialization process (Posas & Fontaine, 1980; Schulz & Schulz, 1994).  
 
Obsolescing Legitimacy 
A series of subsequent coups showed that the coalition supporting the reformist 
government was not powerful enough.  However, the following military governments 
were aware of the need to appease the new emerging social classes and led some modest 
land redistribution programs (Bucheli, 2008).  In 1974, facing a sudden and deep 
economic crisis due to the oil shock, the Honduran military realized that they could not 
remain in power for too long with the same winning coalition.  The military government 
attempted to increase taxation to UFCO, but the company refused to accept a new deal.  
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Aware that in order to assure their political survival, the military accused the firm of 
having historically meddled in internal affairs and exploited the labor force and sought an 
alliance with the labor movement to pressure the firm to increase taxation (Bucheli, 
2008).  As predicted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), the Honduran rulers decided to 
change the distribution of rents and (in Bueno et al.’s (2005) terms) created a new 
winning coalition where UFCO was excluded.  
 The Honduras’ case shows that the company lost its legitimacy more as a result of 
external changing economic conditions, rather than dramatic institutional changes.  
However, the dictators who approached the working class did this in order to protect the 
institutional framework by reforming it and enlarging the government’s winning 
coalition. 
 
Guatemala 
Overview 
Guatemala constitutes a case in which the threats to UFCO’s legitimacy came when 
governments supported by a large winning coalition ruled the country and went against 
the company to redistribute rents.  These governments also changed the institutional 
framework to allow the political participation of a larger segment of the population.  
Guatemala also had a domestic coffee grower class who resented UFCO’s power and was 
an important constituency of the governments relying on a large coalition.  We divide the 
Guatemalan case in two phases of integration of domestic polities, challenge, obsolescing 
legitimacy and new integration of domestic polities after new political changes. 
 
First Integration of Domestic Polities 
UFCO started its operations in Guatemala during the dictatorship of General Manuel 
Estrada (1898-1920).  During his long dictatorship, Estrada ruled surrounded by a small 
group of Guatemalan military and landowning families.  He encouraged foreign direct 
investment to promote economic development and personally negotiated with UFCO.  He 
granted the firm several banana production concessions, a thirty-year export tax 
exemption, and a 99- year railway concession (Taracena, 1993). 
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First Institutional Changes 
After Estrada’s fall, Guatemala enjoyed a ten-year interlude of political opening and 
relatively democratic regimes under which coffee growers could criticize UFCO’s 
excessive control of the national means of transportation, something they could not do 
under Estrada.  The coffee growers became an important element of the democratic 
regimes winning coalition and pressured the government to revise UFCO’s concessions.  
 
First Obsolescing Legitimacy 
During the democratic interlude, the government and coffee growers used UFCO’s 
previous relationship with Estrada to delegitimize its operations (Dosal, 1993).  The 
company was perceived as having obtained extremely generous privileges only possible 
in the absence of political opposition (Taracena, 1993). The 1920s democratic regimes 
pressured and managed to gain some higher taxes from UFCO.  Although these 
governments also granted some concessions to UFCO, they were under less generous 
terms than those granted under Estrada (Dosal, 1993).  
 
Second Integration of Domestic Polities 
The political scenario changed again in UFCO’s favor when right wing dictator Jorge 
Ubico took power in 1931.  This change was reported as positive by UFCO’s railway 
affiliate the International Railways of Central America (IRCA, 1931). Ubico signed a 
contract with UFCO in which the company committed to build a port in exchange of 
land.  In 1936, however, the company dropped the port project so as not to compete with 
IRCA.  The port was never built, but the company kept the land and did not pay any 
reparations.  Deciding to rule with UFCO’s support, Ubico did not permit the coffee 
growers (or anyone else) to protest against UFCO’s actions (Dosal, 1993; Gliejeses, 
1991). 
Ubico’s dictatorship ended because of the opposition of the small but growing 
Guatemalan middle class, who felt that a country controlled by the land-owning oligarchy 
and UFCO did not leave room for them. In 1944, a group of young army officers 
supporting striking schoolteachers overthrew Ubico and called for elections (Schlesinger 
and Kinzer, 1990).  For these rebels, UFCO was the symbol of the exploitation of their 
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country by foreign powers and focused their efforts in diminishing the company’s 
influence. The rebels included Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, who in 1951 was elected 
president (Reid, 2007).   
 
Second Phase of Institutional Changes 
Arbenz’s relationship with UFCO clearly shows a situation in which the winning 
coalition changed and the government alters the institutional framework in order to 
change the way rents had been distributed and reward its winning coalition. He created 
several state companies with the goal of breaking UFCO’s monopoly on energy, 
telecommunications, and railway transportation (Gleijeses, 1991). In addition, he 
approved some social reforms with which he gained support of the labor union 
movement. His biggest goal, however, was an agrarian reform to redistribute land among 
poor peasants. In his view, Guatemala’s unequal land distribution was a major obstacle 
for economic growth and the creation of a middle class (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1990; 
Gleijeses, 1991).  In 1953, he expropriated the first lands including some UFCO’s 
properties.  Both UFCO and the Guatemalan landowning class harshly opposed Arbenz’s 
initiative creating a political crisis that included accusations by the US government 
against Guatemala of being a pawn of the Soviet Union.  In 1954, a group of rebel 
Guatemalan military invaded their own country from neighboring Honduras (where the 
government opposed the Guatemalan policies) to overthrow Arbenz.  Unable to control 
an ever-stronger opposition and an invading force supported by the US Arbenz resigned 
and left the country.  The new military government repressed opposition and stopped 
Arbenz’s reforms (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1990).  As Table 2 shows, Guatemala 
remained ruled by military governments afterwards. 
 
Obsolescing Legitimacy 
For Arbenz, UFCO’s economic power and previous close relationship with dictators such 
as Estrada and Ubico represented a relic of the past.  With a constituency composed by an 
urban middle class and rural lower class Arbenz had strong incentives to redistribute 
income by going against a highly unpopular corporation.  The coup against Arbenz had a 
very high cost for the firm in terms of reputation, reinforcing its image of an abusive 
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imperialistic firm in the eyes of scholars and politicians in the rest of Latin America 
(Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1990). 
 
Costa Rica 
Overview 
Costa Rica has traditionally been considered an exception in Central America, because of 
its relative internal political stability, relatively high standard of living, and lack of long-
term totalitarian regimes (see, Table 2).  UFCO achieved a strong political influence in 
Costa Rica, but the legal political opposition constantly challenged its power.  For a 
country with a larger winning coalition than Guatemala or Honduras, the governments 
could not follow policies like the ones followed by Estrada or Ubico.  In Costa Rica we 
do not have the case of a dramatic institutional change, but we do have a country in 
which the existing institutions went through changes that allowed larger political 
participation and, because of these, the country’s rulers had to approach a larger segment 
of the population if they wanted to assure their political survival.  The country, however, 
was highly dependent on bananas (Table 1), which limited its space of maneuver. 
 
Integration of Domestic Polities 
UFCO did not manage to integrate domestic polities in Costa Rica as successfully as in 
Honduras or Guatemala. Keith, one of UFCO’s founders, had been a very influential man 
in Costa Rican local politics before 1900.  He built the country’s main railways, married 
the daughter of a former president, and was Costa Rica’s main negotiator with foreign 
banks in the 1890s (Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990).  Before forming UFCO, the Costa 
Rican government awarded Keith banana export concessions with no export taxes.  
However, the existence of a congressional opposition made of this concessions source of 
heated debates (Gaspar, 1979).   
 
Institutional Changes 
The political changes permitting further challenges against UFCO occurred within the 
existing institutional framework.  However, what we see in the Costa Rican case is an 
effort by particular political groups to enlarge their winning coalition by approaching 
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those affected by UFCO’s operations.  From the early twentieth century, some politicians 
questioned the existing concessions made to UFCO. Congressman Ricardo Jiménez, one 
of UFCO’s hardest critics, approached independent banana growers who provided the 
company with part of the fruit and plantation workers to pressure the government to 
change the banana policy.  In 1910, Jiménez was elected president supported by those 
providing UFCO with bananas (Chomsky, 1996). 
Having a president critical of UFCO was not enough to decrease the company’s 
power.  First, the company threatened on leaving the country if taxes were increased and, 
second, it provided a much-needed loan to the government to pay its foreign debt 
(Chomsky, 1996; Gaspar, 1979).  It was only until 1926 when the government 
successfully negotiated a tax increase in exchange for new lands for the company.  
Congress, however, took too long at approving the land grant and by the time it did, 
UFCO decided it did not need the lands any longer (Gaspar, 1979). 
A new and more aggressive action by the Costa Rican government took place in 
1934.  Siding with striking banana workers, the government negotiated a new contract in 
which UFCO allowed small planters to use part of its lands and regulated the contracts 
between the company and its local providers.  In exchange, the company received new 
land grants (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987; Chomsky, 1996).  Aware of the problems political 
opposition could generate to their business, UFCO decided to give in to these modest 
local demands (Gaspar, 1979).  UFCO still had important connections, with the Costa 
Rican minister of foreign affairs also being UFCO’s lawyer (García, 1997). 
 
Obsolescing Legitimacy 
Increasing political participation of the working class and the need political parties had of 
workers’ support led to new relations with UFCO in the 1950s. In 1959, the Costa Rican 
congress passed a law requiring all employers to pay employees an end-year bonus, but 
UFCO refused to comply for considering that the legislation was discriminatory and 
violated its contracts with the government.  The government’s main support came from 
the banana workers who went on strike to pressure the company to comply.  Empowered 
by this large and crucial element of its winning coalition, the government continued its 
pressure and the company eventually accepted the new conditions (Bucheli, 2005).  In 
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short, the Costa Rican case shows how gradual institutional changes that increased the 
size of the government’s coalition led to a gradual process of obsolescing legitimacy in 
the part of the company.  In this case, the initial questioning of the firms’ legitimacy 
came from its initial privileges granted resulting from Keith’s connections. 
 Table 3 summarizes UFCO’s process of political integration, the institutional 
changes taking place in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala, and how they affected 
UFCO’s legitimacy. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Consequences of the Moderating Role of Institutional Changes 
Political risk 
The gradual loss of legitimacy of UFCO’s operations had an effect on the firm’s strategy 
and internal structure. As early as 1949, Moody’s Investors Service warned that although 
UFCO was a good investment option, ‘future political developments remain an 
uncertainty’ (Moody’s 1949: 528). This warning coincided with a gloomy letter of the 
company’s president to the shareholders in which he reported labor problems in 
Guatemala and Costa Rica (UFCO, 1949).  In 1951, Moody’s explained the company’s 
lower performance to labor troubles, and when analyzing the company’s negotiations 
with Guatemalan striking workers, Moody’s worried about the possibility of a domino 
effect: ‘If the company compromises [with the workers], labor in other countries would 
probably demand similar concessions’ (Moody’s, 1951, p. 133).  In its annual report, the 
company complained about changing labor relations, in which according to UFCO’s 
president ‘extremists… have kept the laborers in constant state of unrest’ (UFCO, 1951, 
pp. 9-10). 
Before the fall of Guatemala’s Arbenz UFCO was pessimistic about the outcome 
of the conflict and announced it was not going to increase its production capacity: ‘as 
long as the political atmosphere remains inimical to American enterprise, the company 
must of necessity follow a policy of retrenchment’ (UFCO, 1954: 4).  Moody’s worried 
about broader implications: ‘this is not a question of immediate crucial importance to the 
company’s earning power.  More important is whether Guatemalan events are indicative 
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of what may happen elsewhere in Latin America where UFCO operates’ (Moody’s, 1953: 
561). Although UFCO reported Arbenz’s overthrow in 1954 with optimism (UFCO, 
1955), Moody’s warned that ‘further political disturbances in the Caribbean area can 
never be ruled out’ (Moody’s, 1955: 589).  In 1956 it emphasized that ‘the company’s 
operations are subject to natural and foreign political hazards beyond its control’ 
(Moody’s, 1956). 
In 1960, UFCO announced a new business model that included transferring 
production to local growers instead of producing in the company’s plantations to 
‘contribute to the development of stable conditions in the tropics… gain partners who 
would be valuable allies… and reduce the frequent attacks by trouble makers’ (Arthur, et 
al., 1968, p. 148). Moody’s, however, received these changes with cautious optimism 
(Moody’s, 1961, 1962).  
In the late 1960s, UFCO’s management made it clear to its shareholders that it 
needed to adapt to the social and political changes in Central America.  In his 1968 
report, the company’s president expressed the company’s problems of legitimacy when 
saying that, ‘no matter how successful we are in this process [of adaptation and 
divestiture], we still will be perceived, however, I am sure, as a threat to national 
independence and sovereignty’ (UFCO, 1968).  Finally, in 1970, the company justified its 
sales of lands by saying ‘while these operations are in stable countries with enlightened 
governments, the fact is that all Latin American countries are being swept by strong 
winds of nationalist aspiration. [We] must adjust to change… Since 1952 the company 
has divested itself of 65% of its holdings in [Central America]’ (United Brands, 1970).  
Only when the divestiture process was almost complete, Moody’s recommended a buy 
for UFCO stock (Moody’s 1967, 1968).  
In Table 4 we summarize the information on the elements that according to 
UFCO’s management were the most significant at determining the firm’s performance 
according to the annual report to the stockholders.  As the table shows, the great majority 
of issues affecting the company were related to political instability and hostility towards 
its operations in the host countries.  In a far second place the main problems were of 
climatic nature, which would also encourage divestiture of the firm’s operations.  We use 
the characters of the third column of the table (a, b, c, and so on) and over impose them in 
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Figure 7, which displays our calculation on the yield on common stock (explained in our 
methodology section and as displayed in Figure 6) for UFCO, all the companies included 
in the DJ index, and the rubber companies. This calculation complements the narrative of 
Moody’s reports, UFCO’s annual reports, and their summarized version of Table 4.  The 
graph shows that until the late 1940s, UFCO’s yield was lower than that of the rest of the 
firms in the DJ.  During the 1950s, however, UFCO’s yield becomes increasingly higher 
than that of the other firms in the DJ, but it fell again after 1962 when the firm started its 
divestiture process.  As the graph shows, the period in which the yield is higher coincides 
with the era in which the legitimacy of UFCO’s operations faced more challenges and 
hostile actions.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE] 
 
 The rubber companies show a higher yield than that of UFCO until the 1950s, but 
falling afterwards.  The period in which the yield falls takes place when the US rubber 
companies decreased the number of plantations they had abroad and focused on synthetic 
production.  The goal was to decrease the risks owning plantations abroad entailed 
(Bradford and Kerr, 1996). 
 
Vertical Integration 
Increasing challenges to the legitimacy of an MNC create threats to its property rights.  
For a vertically integrated firm like UFCO, the institutional changes taking place in 
Central America provided an incentive to de-integrate its operations.  Our yield 
calculations show that UFCO’s ratio increased when social and political processes in 
Central America allowed new social groups to join the selectorate and the winning 
coalition of the governments.  These changes generated different types of threats that 
discouraged the firm to keep its backward integration and leading it to divest their 
operations and focus on the international marketing operations of the fruit, turning itself 
from a production and marketing company into a marketing one.  Financial analysts 
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perceived the changes taking place in Central America as permanent and believed that the 
environment was not friendly to companies like UFCO anymore and discouraged 
investors to buy UFCO stock. 
 The process we study shows that in times when an institutional framework 
favorable for UFCO’s operations was in place, a vertically integrated structure reduced 
risks of lack of coordination with local planters or opportunism by some of the local 
providers.  Once a series of institutional changes take place, the risks shift from being 
generated by the nature of the good or the local planters to a risk generated by new 
government agendas.  Institutional change created previously non-existent political risks 
and new challenges to the company’s legitimacy.  Under these circumstances, vertical de-
integration reduced these risks. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper develops the concept of obsolescing legitimacy to understand the effect of 
host country institutional changes at the political level in the perceived legitimacy of the 
operations of an MNC. Neo-institutional scholars in organizational studies have analyzed 
the effect of changes in the firms’ legitimacy by focusing in the organizational field level 
(Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Hinings, et al., 2003; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Scott, 2008).  
On the other hand, international business scholars analyzing the legitimacy of MNCs in 
host countries have argued that foreign firms can decrease problems of legitimacy before 
the local society if they integrate the so-called “legitimating actors” within the MNC’s 
subsidiary structure and have them benefit from the MNC’s operations (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Mizruchi, 2006; 
Podolny, 2001).  In this paper we consider the limitations of this strategy by considering 
the implications of institutional changes in political regimes on the economic behavior of 
individual organizations.  This means, we go beyond the organizational field and take 
into account the wider political institutional framework.  Using the conceptual framework 
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and the theory of political survival from Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2005), this paper develops the concept of obsolescing legitimacy to argue 
that when a country goes through a series of political and social changes leading to a new 
institutional framework and a government ruling supported by a different winning 
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coalition, the new group in power might consider previous arrangements between the 
government and foreign MNCs illegitimate.  A new government that establishes a new 
institutional framework will very likely try to change distribution of rents generated by 
the sector in which the MNC operates.  In the particular case in which a small coalition is 
replaced by a larger one and, therefore, the government’s goal is to redistribute rents 
among a larger percentage of the population than under the previous regime, the new 
regime might go against foreign investors, which would put the MNC’s property rights in 
danger.  These actions will be easier to pursue if the very MNC’s operations are 
perceived as illegitimate.  For a company facing these prospects the best strategy to 
follow is to reduce the amount of assets that could be expropriated by divesting its 
operations.   
 We illustrate our point by studying the case of the UFCO in Central America.  
Before World War II, UFCO created a vertically integrated structure of production and 
distribution of bananas from Central America to the US.  These investments were safe of 
any threat partially because UFCO also managed to successfully integrate members of the 
government within its corporate structure.  This was easier to do in countries highly 
dependent on UFCO’s operations and ruled by a government with a small winning 
coalition.  However, with social and political changes taking place that allowed the 
participation in politics of a wider segment of the population, UFCO confronted 
governments that questioned its power and past relationship with more dictatorial 
regimes.  Given that the more democratic regimes needed to assure the loyalty of a 
winning coalition that included the middle class and the labor force, they targeted UFCO 
as a potential source of higher rents to be distributed among the government’s followers.  
As the case of Honduras also shows, a change by which the government’s coalition size 
becomes larger does not necessarily come as a result of a democratization process.  With 
a difficult economic crisis to deal with, the Honduras’ dictators decided in 1974 to shift 
their alliances and sought the support of the working class in order to pressure UFCO to 
provide higher rents to distribute among the population. 
 One of the goals of this essay is to show the benefits of considering a historical 
perspective when analyzing the political relations between governments and MNCs.  
Politics are not static and every regime is the result of a historical process in which 
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previous struggles took place.  Not all regimes share the same kind of stability and no 
political regime type can be considered as a fixed variable the MNCs deal with.  As this 
paper shows, companies can shape the political environment under which they operate, 
but also the changes in this political environment can make a successful strategy into a 
problematic one.  Analyses of the relationship between MNCs and governments need to 
take into account internal struggles for political power in the host countries, the MNCs 
strategies for legitimacy, and the host governments’ strategies to keep themselves in 
power.  Finally, we believe that further studies can use the organizational studies neo-
institutional framework to study changes provoked by the state by considering the MNCs 
as an institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio, 1988).  Given the influence some MNCs can 
have over political institutions in host countries, studying the MNCs as institutional 
entrepreneurs that can shape and legitimize or delegitimize existing political regimes. 
Our concept of obsolescing legitimacy and political institutional change as the 
moderating variable has implications for more contemporary studies in different areas of 
the world. As recent examples in Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Indonesia, and others show, 
expropriation of foreign property is not a practice that disappeared with the end of the 
Cold War (The Economist, 2011a, 2011b) and corporations are increasingly advised to 
take this possibility into account when planning their investments abroad (The Economist, 
2011c). The democratization of South Africa after the fall of the Apartheid regime led to 
some high-ranking members of the new ruling party, the African National Congress, to 
advocate the expropriation of foreign property due to their previous ties with the white 
supremacist racist government (Bond & Sharife, 2009).  After the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2010 
and 2011, many corporations were highly concerned about how their previous close 
relationship with the overthrown undemocratic regimes would put their property rights 
under risk (The Economist, 2011d). The recent case of Temasek Holdings, Singapore’s 
largest investment company provides a good example of consequences of political 
integration under the presence of political institutional change. Early in 2006, Temasek 
paid $3.8bn to purchase a 96.31 percent stake of Shin Corp, a leading Thai 
telecommunications company owned by the family of then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra. This acquisition caused uproar in Thailand and eventually gave rise to the 
military coup in 2006. After the coup, Temasek reduced its stakes in Thailand (Financial 
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Times, 2006a, 2006b; Lhaopadchan, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2011).  Both the current 
environment in international business and historical cases of MNCs operating in different 
countries with different political environments provide scholars plenty of ground to study 
implications of political institutional change.  Our study and the existing more 
contemporary cases also have implications for managers.  Managers of MNCs who 
decide to approach the ruling elite of a particular host country in order to facilitate and 
legitimize their firm’s operations, should consider the possibilities of political 
institutional change and the potential long-term implications of their approach to the 
current ruling elite.  A strategy that can generate handsome short-term benefits can be 
fatal in the long term when political institutional changes take place.   
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Table 1: Exports, Bananas, and Economic Dependence in Central America 
 
(a) Exports of bananas as percentage of total exports 
Year Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras 
1913 50.9 5.7 50.1 
1929 25 12.9 84.9 
1955 41 18 50 
1960 26 11 43 
 
 
(b) Percentage of banana exports exported to the US 
Year Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras 
1931 65 70 73 
1935 100 97 71 
1940 100 100 99 
1945 89 89 88 
1950 75 70 85 
1955 67 67 79 
1961 93 65 95 
 
 
(c) Percentage of exports to the US over total exports 
Year Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras 
1920 65 83 - 
1925 43 52 43 
1930 29.7 40 50 
1935 36.3 54 29 
1940 - 91 - 
1945 - 48 36 
1950 44.6 71 22 
1955 54 59 61 
1960 52 55 57 
1965 50 30 58 
1970 42 25 52 
1975 42 30 48 
Sources: (a) Arthur, et al. (1968: 46), Bulmer-Thomas (1987:58), May and Plaza (1958: 76); (b) 
calculations made with information from Bulmer-Thomas (1987), Ellis (1983); (c) calculations 
made with information from Oxford Latin American Economic History Database; Mitchell, B. R. 
(1998); United Kingdom (1938). 
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Table 2: National Executives and political transitions 
 
(a) Guatemala 
President Years in office Form of succession 
José Reina 1892-1898 Assassinated 
Manuel Estrada Cabrera 1898-1920 Overthrown 
Carlos Herrera 1920 Overthrown 
General José Orellana 1921-26 Died of illness 
General Lazaro Chacón 1926-30 Died of illness 
Baudilio Palma 12-16 December 1930 Overthrown 
General Manuel Orellana 31-Dec-30 Resigned 
José Reina 31 December 1930 
-14 February 1931 
Resigned 
General Jorge Ubico 1931-1944 Resigned 
General Federico Ponce July- October 1944 Overthrown 
Military Provisional Junta 1944-1945 Concluded term with elections 
Juan Arévalo 1945-50 Served electoral term in office 
Jacobo Arbenz 1950-54 Overthrown 
Colonel Carlos Castillo 1954-57 Assassinated 
Luis González July- October 1957 Resigned 
Guillermo Flores 1957-1958 Concluded term with elections 
General Miguel Ydigoras 1958-63 Overthrown 
Colonel Enrique Peralta 1963-65 Concluded term with elections 
Julio Méndez 1966-70 Served electoral term in office 
Colonel Carlos Arana 1970-74 Served electoral term in office 
General Eugenio Kjell 1974-78 Served electoral term in office 
General Romeo Lucas 1978-82 Overthrown 
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(Table 2 continued) 
(b) Honduras 
President Years in office Form of succession 
Manuel Bonilla 1903-07 Overthrown 
Miguel Dávila 1907-11 Overthrown 
Francisco Bertrand 1911-12 Concluded term with elections 
Manuel Bonilla 1912-13 Died of natural causes 
Francisco Bertrand 1913-19 Overthrown 
Francisco Bogran 1919-20 Concluded term with elections 
Rafael López 1920-24 Overthrown 
Vicente Tosta 1924-25 Concluded term with elections 
Miguel Paz 1925-29 Served electoral term in office 
Vicente Mejía 1929-33 Served electoral term in office 
Tiburcio Carías 1933-49 Resigned 
Juan Gálvez 1949-54 Overthrown 
Juan Lozano 1954-56 Overthrown 
Roque Rodríguez 1956-57 Concluded term with elections 
Ramón Villeda 1957-63 Overthrown 
Oswaldo López Arellano 1963-71 Concluded term with elections 
Ramón Cruz 1971-72 Overthrown 
Oswaldo López Arellano 1972-75 Resigned 
 
 
 
(c) Costa Rica 
President Years in office Form of succession 
Ascención Esquivel 1902-06 Served electoral term in office 
Cleto González 1906-10 Served electoral term in office 
Ricardo Jiménez 1910-14 Served electoral term in office 
Alfredo González 1914-17 Overthrown 
Federico Tinoco 1917-19 Overthrown (popular revolt) 
Francisco Aguilar 1919-20 Resigned 
Julio Acosta 1920-24 Served electoral term in office 
Ricardo Jiménez 1924-28 Served electoral term in office 
Cleto González 1928-32 Served electoral term in office 
Ricardo Jiménez 1932-36 Served electoral term in office 
Leon Cortés 1936-40 Served electoral term in office 
Rafael Calderon 1940-44 Served electoral term in office 
Teodoro Picado 1944-48 Overthrown 
José Figueres (junta) 1948-49 Concluded term with elections 
Otilio Ulate 1949-53 Served electoral term in office 
José Figueres 1953-58 Served electoral term in office 
Mario Echandi 1958-62 Served electoral term in office 
Sources: Adapted from Fauriol and Loser (1991), Busey (1961), Posas and Del Cid (1981). 
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Table 3: UFCO's political integration in Central America, institutional changes, and 
obsolescing legitimacy 
Variables Costa Rica Honduras Guatemala 
Degree of Political 
Integration 
Low: UFCO was 
influential but faced 
constant opposition by 
politicians in 
congress. 
High: Before WWII, 
UFCO has several of 
its lawyers in 
influential positions.  
Financed political 
campaign of dictator 
Carías.  
High during periods of 
dictatorship (1900-
1945, 1931-1945) 
Low during 
democratic periods 
(1920-1931, 1945-
1954) or when facing 
the opposition of US 
government (after 
1954) 
Institutional Changes Expansion of the 
government’s winning 
coalition integrating 
working class (1930s, 
1940s) 
Rise of labor 
unionism (1950s) 
Democratization in the 
1920s. 
Democratization in the 
1950s. 
Obsolescing 
Legitimacy 
Banana workers’ 
complaints for 
existing arrangements 
that allowed UFCO to 
abuse its power.  
Government allies 
with the workers 
(1950s). 
Oil crisis (1970s) 
forced military 
regime to seek out the 
labor force and create 
a new winning 
coalition.  Previous 
UFCO privileges 
questioned.  
Democratization 
1920s: previous 
concessions awarded 
to UFCO questioned. 
Democratization 
1950s: UFCO’s 
economic power and 
previous alliance with 
dictatorship 
questioned. 
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Table 4: Issues reported by UFCO as having a significant impact in the firm’s 
performance 
Year Issues highlighted as having a very significant impact on earnings in 
the Annual Reports 
Symbol in 
Figure 
1946 -  
1947 -  
1948 -  
1949 Labor problems in Guatemala, Colombia, and Costa Rica decreased 
production and interrupted shipments 
a 
1950 -  
1951 Labor unrest in Guatemala plantations. The company has problems at 
solving the conflict. 
b 
1952 Slow recovery of the Guatemalan operations after the strike. c 
1953 Expropriation of some of the company’s lands in Guatemala under Jacobo 
Arbenz. 
 UFCO reports problems in the negotiations. 
d, e 
1954 The US Department of Justice files an anti-trust suit against UFCO. 
The company faced a ten-week strike in Honduras. 
f, g 
1955 Big losses for weather problems. h 
1956 Heavy windstorms provoke new losses. i 
1957 The company losses a lawsuit from a group of IRCA’s shareholders. j 
1958 The company announces the change of banana from Gros Michel to 
Cavendish to decrease potential losses from windstorms and Panama 
Disease. 
k 
1959 Conflict with the Costa Rican new government for a “discriminatory” new 
labor legislation. Followed by big strike in the fields. 
The Cuban Agrarian Reform Law made the company’s lands subject to 
expropriation. The company is pessimistic. 
l, m 
1960 UFCO announces a long-term plan to restructure the company that 
includes a much larger role of the associate producers.  
n 
1961 The company reports no labor problems parallel to the larger participation 
of associate producers. 
o 
1962 Losses due to windstorms. p 
1963 -  
1964 -  
1965 UFCO announces that it will lose about 15% of its gross revenue when the 
anti-trust legislation consent is implemented. 
q 
1966 -  
1967 -  
1968 -  
1969 -  
Sources: United Fruit Company (various years) 
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Fig. 1:  Moderating role of institutional change 
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Fig. 2: Obsolescing legitimacy model 
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Fig. 3: UFCO’s degree of vertical integration (asset composition), 1900-1970 
 
Source: UFCO, Annual Report, various years. 
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Fig. 4: Land acreage owned by United Fruit (banana lands) 
 
Source: United Fruit Company, Annual Report, various years. 
 
 41 
Fig. 5: Polity scores for Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, 1900-1982 
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
P
ol
ity
 2
 S
co
re
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Year
COSTA RICA GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace (2009) 
 42 
Fig. 6: Yield on common stock UFCO, Dow Jones, and companies in the rubber 
industry 
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Source: Calculations made with information from Dow Jones (2009), CRSP (2009), 
and Wharton Research Data Services (2009). 
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Fig. 7: Relative Yields of Common Stock of UFCO, the Rubber Industry, and the Dow 
in Relation to the Main Events Affecting UFCO’s Operations.  
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Source: Calculations made with information from Dow Jones (2009), CRSP (2009), 
and Wharton Research Data Services (2009). 
